Abstract-In this paper, we introduce two new achievable schemes for the fading multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT). In the model that we consider, we assume that perfect knowledge of the state of all channels is available at all the nodes in a causal fashion. Our schemes use this knowledge together with the time-varying nature of the channel model to align the interference from different users at the eavesdropper perfectly in a one-dimensional space while creating a higher dimensionality space for the interfering signals at the legitimate receiver, hence allowing for better chance of recovery. While we achieve this alignment through signal scaling at the transmitters in our first scheme (scaling-based alignment), we let nature provide this alignment through the ergodicity of the channel coefficients in the second scheme [ergodic secret alignment (ESA)] [1], [2]. For each scheme, we obtain the resulting achievable secrecy rate region. We show that the secrecy rates achieved by both schemes in the two-user fading MAC-WT scale with signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as 1 2 log(SNR). Hence, we show the suboptimality of the independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian signaling-based schemes with and without cooperative jamming by showing that the secrecy rates achieved using i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with cooperative jamming do not scale with SNR. In addition, we introduce an improved version of our ESA scheme where we incorporate cooperative jamming to achieve higher secrecy rates. Moreover, we derive the necessary optimality conditions for the power control policy that maximizes the secrecy sum rate achievable by our ESA scheme when used solely and with cooperative jamming. Finally, we discuss the extension of the proposed schemes to the case where there are more than two users and show that, for the -user fading MAC-WT, each of the two schemes achieves secrecy sum rate that scales with SNR as 1 log(SNR).
, and Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [6] . Wyner [4] introduced the wiretap channel where it is assumed that the received signal by the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the signal received by the legitimate receiver. For his model, Wyner established the secrecy capacity region, which is defined as the region of all simultaneously achievable rates and equivocation rates. In [5] , the secrecy capacity region was established for the general case where the eavesdropper's channel is not necessarily a degraded version of the main receiver's channel. In particular, it was shown that to achieve the secrecy capacity region of the single user wiretap channel, channel prefixing may be necessary. In channel prefixing, an auxiliary random variable serves as the input of an artificially created prefix channel, whose output is used as the input to the original wiretap channel. In [6] , the authors showed that, through plain Gaussian signaling alone, i.e., without channel prefixing, one can achieve the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel.
The multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT) was introduced in [7] . In MAC-WT, multiple users wish to have secure communication with a single receiver, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. Tekin and Yener [7] , [8] focus on the Gaussian MAC-WT and provide achievable schemes based on Gaussian signaling. They go further than plain Gaussian signaling and introduce a technique (on top of Gaussian signaling) that uses the power of a non-transmitting node in jamming the eavesdropper. This technique is called cooperative jamming (CJ) . CJ is indeed a channel prefixing technique where specific choices are made for the auxiliary random variables [9] . In addition, CJ is the first significant application of channel prefixing in a multiuser Gaussian wiretap channel that improves over plain Gaussian signaling. More recently, [10] showed that for a certain class of Gaussian MAC-WT, one can achieve through Gaussian signaling a secrecy rate region that is within 0.5 bits of the secrecy capacity region. Consequently, there has been some expectation that secrecy capacity may be obtained for Gaussian MAC-WT through independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian signaling, potentially with Gaussian channel prefixing.
However, a notable shortcoming of these Gaussian signaling based achievable schemes is that rates obtained using them do not scale with the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). In other words, the total number of degrees of freedom (DoF) for the MAC-WT achieved using these schemes is zero. This observation led to the belief that these schemes, and hence Gaussian signaling (with or without channel prefixing), may be suboptimal. This belief is made certain as a direct consequence of the results on the secure DoF of Gaussian interference networks that were obtained in several papers, e.g., in [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . The schemes in each of [11] and [12] mainly relied on the interference alignment technique proposed by Cadambe and Jafar for the -user interference channel in their pioneering work [16] . In the original interference alignment technique, the input data stream from each 0018-9448/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE user is mapped using a precoding matrix to a longer sequence (almost twice the original length in the asymptotic sense) and then sent over the channel. Hence, the observed signal space at each receiver is of almost twice the size (i.e., dimensionality) of the space of the original data. By carefully designing the precoding matrices at the transmitters, the observed signal space at each receiver could be partitioned into two almost equal subspaces, one of which is meant for the desired signal and the other acts as a waste basket for the interfering signals from other users. Consequently, it was shown that one can achieve DoF per user in the -user interference channel using this technique. Inspired by this technique in the secrecy context, it was shown in [11] and [12] that positive secure DoF is achievable for a class of vector Gaussian interference channels. In fact, this result is also valid for time-varying channels with only causal knowledge of channel state information which, in turn, implies that positive secure DoF is achievable for the vector Gaussian MAC-WT in general. In [13] and [14] , it was shown that through structured coding (e.g., lattice coding), it is possible to achieve positive DoF for a class of scalar (i.e., nontime-varying) Gaussian channels with interference that contains the Gaussian MAC-WT. More recently, in [15] , both the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) MAC-WT and the Gaussian scalar MAC-WT have been considered. For the -user Gaussian MIMO MAC-WT model, [15] provides an algorithm which is inspired by the original interference alignment technique [16] to separate the received signals at the legitimate receiver and at the same time align them in a low-dimensional subspace in the signal space observed by the eavesdropper. For the -user Gaussian scalar MAC-WT, [15] proposes an achievable secure coding scheme to achieve positive secure DoF. Namely, the proposed scheme achieves total secure DoF of for almost all channel gains. This is done by incorporating the new alignment technique known as real interference alignment that was first proposed in [17] that performs on a single real line and exploits the properties of real numbers to align interference in time-invariant channels.
Fading Gaussian MAC-WT was first considered in [18] where the Gaussian signaling and CJ schemes which were originally proposed in [7] and [8] are extended to the fading MAC-WT. Using these schemes, [18] gave achievable ergodic sum secrecy rates for the fading MAC-WT. Similar to the nonfading setting, these achievable ergodic secrecy rates do not scale with the average SNRs. In this paper, we propose two new achievable schemes for the fading Gaussian MAC-WT. Our first achievable scheme, the scaling based alignment (SBA) scheme, is based on code repetition with proper scaling of transmitted signals. We first consider the two-user fading MAC-WT. The generalization of this scheme to the case of more than two users is presented subsequently. In particular, for the two-user fading MAC-WT, transmitters repeat their symbols in two consecutive symbol instants. Transmitters further scale their transmit signals with the goal of creating a full-rank channel matrix at the main receiver and a unit-rank channel matrix at the eavesdropper, in every two consecutive time instants. These coordinated actions create a two-dimensional space for the signal received by the legitimate receiver, while sustaining the interference in a single-dimensional space at the eavesdropper. In other words, code repetition with proper scaling of the transmit signals at each transmitter aligns the received signals at the eavesdropper perfectly making it difficult for the eavesdropper to decode both messages. Consequently, we obtain a new achievable secrecy rate region for the two-user fading MAC-WT. In fact, it might be useful here to compare our SBA scheme with the technique used in [15] for the Gaussian MIMO MAC-WT. In the model considered here, we could create parallel MAC channels to each of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper by symbol repetition and exploiting the time-varying nature of fading channels and hence by proper scaling (precoding), one can almost surely create a full-dimensional space for the received signal at the legitimate receiver and one-dimensional space for the received signal at the eavesdropper. On the other hand, in [15] , the existence of multiple spatial dimensions are already imposed by the model itself (Gaussian MIMO MAC-WT) and hence the precoding technique used in [15] for this model achieves secure DoF that eventually depends on the channel gain matrices from the transmitters to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
In another recent work [19] , it was shown that in a fading interference channel, by code repetition over properly chosen time instants, one can perfectly cancel interference at each receiver so that the resulting individual rates scale as . Thus, the rate reduction by a factor of comes with the benefit of perfect interference cancellation. In this paper, we extend the ergodic interference alignment concept to a secrecy context and propose another achievable scheme which we call ergodic secret alignment (ESA). We first consider the two-user fading MAC-WT and generalize this scheme to the case of more than two users subsequently. In the SBA scheme, code repetition is done over two consecutive time instants, while in the ESA scheme, we carefully choose the time instants over which we do code repetition such that the received signals are aligned favorably at the legitimate receiver while they are aligned unfavorably at the eavesdropper. In particular, given some time instant with the vector of the main receiver channel coefficients and the vector of the eavesdropper channel coefficients given by and , respectively, if and are the symbols transmitted in this time instant by users 1 and 2, respectively, our objective, roughly speaking, is to determine the channel gains we should wait for to transmit and again. In this paper, we show that, in order to maximize achievable secrecy rates, we should wait for a time instant in which the main receiver channel coefficients are and the eavesdropper channel coefficients are . Consequently, we obtain another achievable secrecy rate region for the two-user fading MAC-WT.
For both proposed schemes, we show that the resulting secrecy rates scale with SNR. Specifically, the achievable secrecy sum rate scales as . Moreover, we show that the secrecy rates achieved through i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with CJ in fading MAC-WT do not scale with SNR. The significance of these results is that, they show that indeed neither plain i.i.d. Gaussian signaling nor i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with CJ is optimal for the fading MAC-WT, and that, for high SNRs, one can achieve higher secrecy rates by aligning interference perfectly in the eavesdropper MAC while reducing, or canceling, interference at the main receiver MAC using some coordinated actions at both transmitters that involve code repetition, i.e., a form of time-correlated (non-i.i.d.) signaling.
In fact, the achievable rate region using the second scheme, the ESA scheme, involves two significant improvements over the one achieved by the SBA scheme when the channel coefficients are circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables. First, the expressions for achievable rates by the SBA scheme involve products of the squared magnitudes of the channel coefficients. The squared magnitudes of the channel coefficients are exponential random variables and hence multiplying them together gives a random variable that takes small values with higher probability than the original exponential random variables would take these values. This in effect reduces the achievable rates by the SBA scheme. On the other hand, the achievable secrecy rates by the ESA scheme do not have this drawback. In other words, by code repetition, the SBA scheme creates two (not perfectly) correlated MAC channels to the main receiver and two perfectly correlated MAC channels to the eavesdropper, while the ESA scheme creates an orthogonal MAC channel to the main receiver and two perfectly correlated MAC channels to the eavesdropper. This fact leads to higher achievable secrecy rates by the ESA scheme. The second improvement of the ESA scheme with respect to the SBA scheme is that the average power constraints associated with the ESA scheme do not involve any channel coefficients, whereas those associated with the SBA scheme involve the gains of the eavesdropper channel which, in turn, result in inefficient use of transmit powers. However, it is noteworthy that SBA scheme holds one practical advantage over the ESA scheme that actually does not appear in the achievable rates by the two schemes. Namely, in the SBA scheme, we do not wait for favorable channel conditions for alignment since repetition is done over consecutive time slots. On the other hand, in the ESA scheme, one should wait for the proper channel conditions before repetition takes place. The waiting time required to match up the channel states is an important performance factor for the ESA scheme in practice.
In addition, we introduce an improved version of our second scheme in which we use CJ on top of the ESA scheme to achieve higher secrecy rates. Moreover, since the rate expressions achieved by the ESA scheme (with and without CJ) and their associated average power constraints are simpler than their counterparts in the SBA scheme, we derive the necessary conditions on the optimal power allocations that maximize the sum secrecy rate achieved by the ESA scheme when used alone and when used together with CJ. Since the achievable secrecy sum rate, in general, is not a concave function in the power allocation policy, the solution of such optimization problem may not be unique. Hence, we obtain a power allocation policy that satisfies the necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of optimality.
We provide numerical examples that illustrate the scaling of the sum rates achieved by the proposed schemes with SNR and the saturation of the secrecy sum rate achieved by the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling scheme with CJ. We also give numerical examples for the secrecy sum rates achieved by the ESA scheme with and without CJ when power control is used.
Finally, we discuss the extension of the SBA and the ESA schemes to the case of -user fading MAC-WT channel for . We show that each of the two schemes achieves a total of secure DoF which is the same total secure DoF shown in [15] to be achievable for the -user Gaussian scalar MAC-WT for almost all channel gains using the real interference alignment technique.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the two-user fading multiple access channel with an external eavesdropper. Transmitter chooses a message from a set of equally likely messages , , 2. Every transmitter encodes its message into a codeword of length symbols. The channel output at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper at the symbol interval are given by (1) (2) where, for , 2, is the input signal at transmitter at channel use , , are the channel coefficients at channel use between transmitter and the intended receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. We assume a fast fading scenario where the channel coefficients randomly vary from one symbol to another in i.i.d. fashion. Also, we assume the independence of all channel coefficients and for all , . Each of the channel coefficients is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero-mean. The variances of and are and , respectively, for all . Hence, and are exponentially distributed random variables with mean and , respectively. Moreover, we assume that all the channel coefficients are known to all the nodes in a causal fashion. In (1)- (2) , and are the independent Gaussian noises at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and are i.i.d. (in time) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit-variance. For the rest of this paper, we will drop the time index for notational convenience unless it is clearly stated otherwise. We have the usual average power constraints (3) A code for this channel consists of two encoders , , 2 which maps a message to a sequence of complex numbers , and a decoder which maps the received sequence at the main receiver and the channel state sequences , , , to an estimate of the message pair . The probability of error is . A rate pair is said to be achievable with perfect secrecy if there is a code satisfying and .
III. PREVIOUSLY KNOWN RESULTS
Here, we summarize previously known results that are relevant to our development. For the general discrete-time memoryless MAC-WT, the best known achievable secrecy rate region [7] [8] [9] is given by the convex hull of all rate pairs satisfying (4) (5) (6) where the distribution factors as . Known secrecy rate regions for the Gaussian MAC-WT can be obtained from these expressions by appropriate selections for the involved random variables. For instance, the Gaussian signaling-based achievable rates proposed in [7] are obtained by choosing and , i.e., no channel prefixing, and by choosing and to be Gaussian with full power. On the other hand, CJ-based achievable rates proposed in [8] are obtained by choosing and , and then by choosing , , , to be independent Gaussian random variables [9] . Namely, for , 2, and are Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variances and , respectively. Here, and carry messages, while and are jamming signals. The powers of and should be chosen to satisfy the power constraints of users 1 and 2, respectively. These selections yield the following achievable rate region for the Gaussian MAC-WT [8] : (7) (8) (9) where the powers of the signals must satisfy (10) where and are the transmission and jamming powers, respectively, of user .
The ergodic secrecy rate region achieved by Gaussian signaling and CJ for the fading MAC-WT can be expressed similarly by simply including expectations over fading channel states [18] (11) (12) (13) where , , and the instantaneous powers and , which are both functions of and , satisfy (14) IV. SCALING BASED ALIGNMENT (SBA)
In this section, we introduce a new achievable scheme for the fading MAC-WT. Our achievable scheme is based on code repetition with proper scaling of the signals transmitted by each transmitter. This is done as follows. For the channel described in (1) and (2), we use a repetition code such that each transmitter repeats its channel input symbol twice over two consecutive time instants. Due to code repetition, we may regard each of the MACs to the main receiver and to the eavesdropper as a vector MAC composed of two parallel scalar MACs, one for the odd time instants and the other for the even time instants. Consequently, we may describe the main receiver MAC channel by the following pair of equations:
where, for , 2, , are the coefficients of the th main receiver channel in odd and even time instants, , and , are the received signal and the noise at the main receiver in odd and even time instants. In the same way, we may describe the eavesdropper MAC channel by the following pair of equations:
(17) (18) where for , 2, , are the coefficients of the th eavesdropper channel in odd and even time instants, , and , are the received signal and the noise at the eavesdropper in odd and even time instants.
Since all the channel gains are known to all nodes in a causal fashion, the two transmitters use this knowledge as follows. In every symbol instant, each transmitter scales its transmit signal with the gain of the other transmitter's channel to the eavesdropper. That is, in every symbol duration, the first user multiplies its channel input with , the channel gain of the second user to the eavesdropper, and the second user multiplies its channel input with , the channel gain of the first user to the eavesdropper. Hence the main receiver MAC can be described as (19) (20) and the eavesdropper MAC can be described as (21) (22) It is clear from (19) and (20) that the space of the received signal (without noise, i.e., high SNR) of the main receiver over the two consecutive time instants is 2-D almost surely. In other words, the channel matrix of the main receiver vector MAC is full-rank almost surely. This is due to the fact that the channel coefficients are drawn from continuous bounded distributions. On the other hand, it is clear from (21) and (22) that the channel matrix of the eavesdropper vector MAC is unit-rank. That is, the two ingredients of our scheme, i.e., code repetition and signal scaling, let the interfering signals at the main receiver live in a 2-D space, while they align the interfering signals at the eavesdropper in a 1-D space. As we will show in the Section VI, these properties play a central role in achieving secrecy rates that scale with SNR.
Let and . We define and in the same way. For , 2, we define the power allocation policy of transmitter as a mapping which maps to a nonnegative real number which is the power of transmitter in the odd time slot for which the values of channel gains are . Note that due to symbol repetition, is a function of only and does not depend on . To simplify notation, we will use to denote since this dependence on channel gains is implicitly understood. We note that, due to signal scaling at the transmitters, the average power constraints become (23) (24) Now, we evaluate the secrecy rate region achievable by our SBA scheme. Given the vector channels (19) , (20) and (21), (22), the following secrecy rates are achievable [7] [8] [9] : (25) (26) (27) where and . These expressions for achievable rates follow from (4)-(6) by treating channel states as outputs at the receivers, and noting the independence of channel inputs and channel states. We note that the factor of on the right-hand sides of (25)-(27) is due to repetition coding. Now, by computing (25)-(27) with Gaussian signals, we obtain the secrecy rate region given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For the two-user fading MAC-WT, the rate region given by all rate pairs satisfying constraints (28)-(30), shown at the bottom of the page, is achievable with perfect secrecy where , are the power allocation policies (as defined above) of users 1 and 2, respectively, that satisfy (31) (32) where and are the average power constraints.
V. ERGODIC SECRET ALIGNMENT (ESA)
After we have devised the SBA scheme, the ergodic interference alignment scheme of Nazer et al. [19] inspired us to propose an improved achievable scheme. In this section, we discuss this scheme which we call ESA. The new ingredient in this scheme is to perform repetition coding at two carefully chosen time instances as opposed to two consecutive time instances as we have done in Section IV.
For the MAC-WT described by (1) and (2), we use a repetition code in a way similar to the one in [19] . The simple idea of the scheme is that we repeat each code symbol in the time instant that holds certain channel conditions relative to the those conditions in the time instant where this code symbol is first transmitted. Namely, given a time instant with the main receiver channel state vector and the eavesdropper channel state vector , where the symbols and are first transmitted by the two transmitters, we will solve for the channel states and , where these symbols should be repeated again, such that the resulting secrecy rates achieved by Gaussian signaling are maximized.
The aforementioned description is an intuitive description that gives the idea of the scheme which is based on the concept of ergodic interference alignment introduced in [19] . A rigorous description and proof follow the arguments in [19] . In particular, the idea of the proof [19] is first to quantize the channel coefficients and deal with the quantized coefficients rather than dealing with the original coefficients defined over (28) (29) (30) the whole complex plane. Then, one can show that those quantized channel coefficients of the same type (distribution) could be paired with another set of quantized channel coefficients of a symmetric type. Consequently, one can derive the achievable rate when such pairing between symmetric types is employed. Finally, using the continuity of the achievable rate as a function in channel coefficients, one can argue that by decreasing the quantization bin size, one can approach the desired rate for the original channel (with complex coefficients) in the limit. The detailed proof is found in [19] .
Due to code repetition, we may regard each of the MACs to the main receiver and to the eavesdropper as a vector MAC composed of two parallel scalar MACs, one for each one of the two time instants over which the same code symbols and are transmitted. Consequently, we may describe the main receiver MAC channel by the following pair of equations:
where , and , are the received symbols and the noise at the main receiver in the two time instants of code repetition. In the same way, we may describe the eavesdropper MAC channel by the following pair of equations:
where , and , are the received symbols and the noise at the eavesdropper in the two time instants of code repetition. For , 2, we define the power allocation policy of transmitter in a way similar to the way it was defined in the SBA scheme. Namely, it is defined as a mapping which maps the values of the channel gains to a nonnegative real number which is the power of transmitter when the channel gains take the values . Again, to simplify notation, we will use to denote since this dependence on channel gains is implicitly understood.
In the next theorem, we give another achievable secrecy rate region for the two-user fading MAC-WT. The achievable region is obtained using (25)-(27) and replacing and with and , respectively, and evaluating these expressions with Gaussian signals, and by choosing optimal and to maximize the achievable rates. As we will show shortly as a result of Theorem 2, the optimal selection of and will yield an orthogonal MAC to the main receiver and a scalar MAC to the eavesdropper. In writing the achievable rate expressions, we will again account for code repetition by multiplying achievable rates by a factor of .
Theorem 2:
For the two-user fading MAC-WT, the rate region given by all rate pairs satisfying the following constraints is achievable with perfect secrecy:
where and are the power allocation policies of users 1 and 2, respectively, and are both functions of and in general (as defined previously). In addition, they satisfy the average power constraints (40) (41)
Proof: First, consider the two vector MACs given by (33)-(36). Observe that as in [19] , must be chosen such that it has the same distribution as and must be chosen such that it has the same distribution as . The reason for this can be understood from the idea of the proof in [19] discussed earlier in this section. Indeed, in the quantized channel, in order for the pairing between channel coefficients at two different instants to be possible, the values of the channel coefficients at the two time instants must occur with the same probability. That is why we require that and to have the same distributions as and , respectively. Now, since and where and , then in order to achieve the requirement above, it follows from the symmetry property of the complex Gaussian distribution that the channel realizations and must be paired with the channel realizations and , respectively, that are related as and for some unitary matrices and (rotations in ). Furthermore, for such rotations to preserve the variances of the individual components of (i.e., ) and of (i.e., ), we must have and for some , , , . Then, it follows that (33)- (36) 
VI. DEGREES OF FREEDOM (DOF)
In this section, we show that the secrecy sum rates achieved by our schemes scale with SNR as and that the secrecy sum rate achieved by the CJ scheme given in [18] does not scale with SNR. What we give here are rigorous proofs for intuitive results. Since by looking at (30) and (39), one can note that, if we assume that , then if we take , as becomes large, roughly speaking, in (30) the first term inside the expectation grows as while the second term grows as and hence the overall expression grows as ; and similarly, in (39), all three terms inside the expectation grow as and hence the overall expression grows as . In the same way, by considering the secrecy sum rate achieved by the CJ scheme given in (13) , then by referring to the power allocation policies given in [18] , one can also roughly say that for all channel states, as the available average power goes to infinity, the overall expression converges to a constant.
For simplicity, we assume symmetric average power constraints for all schemes, i.e., we set in (31)-(32), (40)-(41), and (14) . We also assume that all channel gains are drawn from continuous bounded distributions and that all channel gains have finite variances. Let be the achievable secrecy sum rate, then the total number of achievable secure DoF, , is defined as (53) We start by the DoF analysis of our proposed schemes, i.e., the SBA scheme and the ESA scheme, where we show that the sum secrecy rates obtained by these schemes achieve secure DoF, then we provide a rigorous proof for the fact that the scheme of [18] which is based on i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with CJ achieves a secrecy sum rate that does not scale with SNR, i.e., achieves zero secure DoF.
A. Secure DoF With the SBA Scheme
We make the following choices for the power allocation policies and of the SBA scheme. We set ,
. It can be verified that these choices satisfy the power constraints (31)-(32). Denoting the expression inside the expectation in (30) by , the secrecy sum rate achieved using the SBA scheme can be written as (54) Hence, the total achievable secure DoF is given by (55) Now, we show that, for the two-user fading MAC-WT, a total number of secure DoF is achievable with the SBA scheme. Toward this end, it suffices to show that the order of the limit and the expectation in (55) can be reversed. To do this, we make use of Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem. Now, we note that for large enough , is upper bounded by given by (56), shown at the bottom of the next page. 
B. Secure DoF With the ESA Scheme
We show that the ESA scheme achieves secure DoF in the two-user fading MAC-WT. Here, we also use a constant power allocation policy for the ESA scheme where we set for all channel states. Clearly, this constant policy satisfies the average power constraints (40)-(41). Denoting the expression inside the expectation in (39) by , the achievable secrecy sum rate, is given by
Hence, the total achievable secure DoF is given by
We note that for large enough , where
Again, using the fact that all channel gains have finite variances together with Jensen's inequality, we have
Then, by the dominated convergence theorem, we have (63) Hence, from (60), we have .
C. Secure DoF With i.i.d. Gaussian Signaling With CJ
We consider the secrecy sum rate achieved by Gaussian signaling with CJ [18] in the fading MAC-WT and show that this achievable rate does not scale with SNR. We start with the secrecy sum rate given by the right-hand side of (13) . According to the optimal power allocation policy described in [18] VII. ESA SCHEME WITH CJ The result given in Theorem 2 can be strengthened by adding the technique of CJ to the ESA scheme of Section V. We refer to the resulting scheme as ESA/CJ. This is done through Gaussian channel prefixing as discussed in Section III. In particular, we choose the channel inputs in (33)-(36) to be and , and then choose , , , to be independent Gaussian random variables. Namely, for , 2, and are Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variances and , respectively. Here, and carry messages, while and are jamming signals. The powers of and should be chosen to satisfy the average power constraints of users 1 and 2, respectively. After these selections are made, the transmitters repeat their channel inputs and over two time instants in the same way described in the ESA scheme of Section V. In particular, when transmitters 1 and 2 repeat and , they repeat their selections of and , respectively. Accordingly, the ESA scheme yield the achievable rate region given by (73)-(75), shown at the bottom of the page, where, for , 2, and are the transmission and jamming power allocation policies, respectively, of user , and are both functions of and in general. In addition, they satisfy the average power constraints (76) This achievable rate region, through an appropriate power control strategy (see Section IX), can be made strictly larger than the region given in Theorem 2.
VIII. MAXIMIZING SECRECY SUM RATE OF THE ESA SCHEME
In this section, we consider the problem of maximizing the secrecy sum rate achieved by the ESA scheme as a function of the power allocations and of users 1 and 2, respectively. We define and . Then, we define and . The achievable secrecy sum rate is given by (77) We can write the optimization problem as for some , , , 2. It should be noted here that (81) and (82) are only necessary conditions for the optimal power allocations and since the objective function, i.e., the achievable secrecy sum rate, is not concave in in general.
For each channel state, we distinguish between three nonzero forms that the solution of (81) and (82) (81) and (82), we can derive the following necessary and sufficient conditions for the positivity of the optimal power allocation policies:
Consequently, according to conditions (87) and (88), we can divide the set of all possible channel states into 7 partitions such that in each partition the solution will either have one of the three forms stated above or will be zero. Hence, the power allocation policy that satisfies (81), (82) and (79), (80) can be fully described in 7 different cases of the channel gains. The details of such cases are given in Appendix A.
IX. MAXIMIZING SECRECY SUM RATE
OF THE ESA/CJ SCHEME In this section, we consider the problem of maximizing the achievable secrecy sum rate as a function in the power allocation policies and when CJ technique is used on top of the ESA scheme. Again, we define and . Then, we define and . In this case, the optimization problem is described by (89)- (91), shown at the bottom of the page.
We first show that, at any fading state, splitting a user's power into transmission and jamming is suboptimal, i.e., an optimum power allocation policy must not have and simultaneously. We note that whether we split powers or not does not affect the first three terms of the objective function since we can always convert jamming power of user into transmission power of the same user and vice versa while keeping the sum fixed. Hence, we consider the last three terms of the sum rate. For convenience, we define (92) Consider, without loss of generality, the power allocation for user 1. We assume that , is the optimum power allocation for user 1. We observe that the sign of (93) does not depend on . Consider a power allocation , . Hence, we have and the first three terms in the expression of the achievable sum rate do not change. On the other hand, if (93) is positive, any positive results in an increase in the achievable sum rate and jamming with the same sum power is better. While, if (93) is negative, then any negative results in an increase in the achievable sum rate and transmitting with the same sum power is better. If (93) is zero, then the sum rate does not depend on and we can set it to zero, i.e., use the sum power in transmitting. Therefore, the optimum power allocation will have either or , but not both.
Suppose that , , , and are the optimal power allocations. Then, the necessary KKT conditions satisfy (94)- (97), shown at the bottom of the next page, for some , , , , 2. As in Section VIII, we note that (94)-(97) are only necessary conditions for the optimal power allocations , , , and since the objective function, i.e., the achievable secrecy sum rate, is not concave in in general. Therefore, we give power control policies , , , and that satisfy these necessary conditions. That is, we obtain one fixed point of the Lagrangian such that satisfies the constraints (90) 
X. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some simple simulation results. We also plot the sum secrecy rate achieved using our SBA and ESA schemes, as well as the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with cooperative jamming (GS/CJ) scheme in [18] . First, the secrecy sum rates achieved by the SBA and the ESA schemes scale with SNR. Hence, these rates exceed the one achieved by the GS/CJ scheme for high SNR. Second, the secrecy sum rate achieved by the ESA scheme is larger than the one achieved by the SBA scheme for all SNR.
In our first set of simulations, we use a rudimentary power allocation policy for our SBA and ESA schemes. For the SBA scheme, we first note, from (30), that the secrecy sum rate achieved can be expressed as a nested expectation as in (98), shown at the bottom of the page, where , ,
, and . For those channel gains , for which the inner expectation with respect to , is negative, we set . Otherwise, we set and . Note that turning off the powers for some values of the channel gains , is possible since and are functions of and . Second, note that, if a power allocation satisfies the average power constraints, then the modified power allocation where the powers are turned off at some channel states, also satisfies the power constraints. For the ESA scheme, we first note, from (39), that the achievable secrecy sum rate is (99)
In this case, we set for those values of channel gains for which the difference inside the expectation is negative.
Otherwise, we set and . Again, turning the powers off does not violate power constraints for a power allocation scheme which already satisfies the power constraints. For the GS/CJ scheme, we use the power allocation scheme described in [18] .
In Fig. 1 , the secrecy sum rate achieved by each of the three schemes is plotted versus the average SNR that we define as . In all simulations, we set , we also take . Clearly, the secrecy sum rate achieved by the GS/CJ scheme saturates as we increase the SNR while the secrecy sum rate achieved by the SBA and the ESA schemes grows unboundedly with the SNR. One can also notice, as discussed earlier, that the secrecy sum rate achieved by the ESA scheme is larger than the one achieved by the SBA scheme which is due to the fact that the ESA scheme creates two totally uncorrelated parallel MAC channels (i.e., orthogonal MAC) between the transmitters and the main receiver.
Next, in Fig. 2 , we plot secrecy sum rates achievable with constant power allocation together with secrecy sum rates achievable with power control for the ESA scheme with and without CJ. It is clear here that the secrecy sum rate achieved by the ESA/CJ scheme (with power control) is larger than the rate achieved when the ESA scheme is used solely without CJ (with or without power control). One may also note that, for low SNR, the GS/CJ scheme still gives better rates than those achieved by all the proposed schemes which is due to the factor of in the rates achieved by the proposed schemes due to code repetition. 
A. SBA Scheme
Here, we use a repetition code in which each transmitter repeats its channel input symbol over consecutive time instants. Moreover, in every time instant, , transmitter multiplies its channel input by . Thus, over consecutive time instants, the channel outputs at the main receiver and the eavesdropper are given by (103) (104) where and denote the observations at the th time instant at each of the main receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and denote the channel coefficients at the th time instant from the th transmitter to the main receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Note that due to such scaling at the transmitters, the average power constraints become (105) It is clear from (103) and (104) that the observed signal space (without noise, i.e., at high SNR) of the main receiver over the consecutive time instants is -dimensional almost surely whereas that of the eavesdropper is 1-D. Indeed, one can express (103) and (104) as (106) (107) where , , , is full-rank matrix of effective channel gains from the transmitters to the main receiver, and is unit-rank matrix of effective channel gains from the transmitters to the eavesdropper, where the elements at the th row and the th column of and are given, respectively, by
Hence, the achievable secrecy sum rate is given by (110) where and denotes the conjugate transpose of the matrix . In fact, the system given in (106) is equivalent to MIMO channel with independent signaling across the antennas. Since is full-rank, such MIMO channel possesses exactly DoF. On the other hand, the system given in (107) is equivalent to MIMO channel with independent signaling across the antennas and since is unit-rank, such MIMO channel possesses exactly 1 DoF. Therefore, while deriving the total secure DoF achieved by the SBA scheme, conditioned on and , the first term inside the expectation above yields DoF whereas the second term inside the expectation yields 1 DoF. Thus, the total achievable secure DoF is .
B. ESA Scheme
In order to extend the ESA scheme to the case of more than two users, i.e., -user fading MAC-WT channel with , we use a repetition code, where each code symbol is repeated times over channel uses. However, unlike the SBA scheme, repetition is done over channel uses that hold certain conditions relative to those conditions in the channel use where this code symbol is first transmitted. For , let
where and denote the channel coefficients at the th channel use from the th transmitter to the main receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Following the same steps given in Section V, one can easily verify that the optimal repetition channel use , (relative to the channel use where the first copy of the symbol is transmitted) must be chosen such that (113) (114) where (115) where . Note that, as explained in Section V, the above argument is based on the proof of the ergodic interference alignment technique given in [19] . The main idea is to quantize the channel coefficients and then group the sets of coefficients of symmetric types together. That is indeed tantamount to grouping together. Note that indeed this is possible due to the circular symmetry of the distribution of the channel coefficients. Then, using the continuity of the achievable rate as a function in channel coefficients, by decreasing the quantization bin size, one can approach the desired rate in the limit.
According to the selection given by (113) and (114), one can describe the main receiver and the eavesdropper MAC channels over such channel uses by (116) (117) for , where and are the observations at channel use at the main receiver and the eavesdropper, re-spectively, and are the noise values at channel use at the main receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and where , is the channel input of transmitter .
Using similar argument to the one in Section V, it is easy to see that the system in (116) is equivalent to an orthogonal -user MAC channel where each component of such orthogonal MAC channel has unit-variance noise and channel gain , , whereas the system in (117) is equivalent to 1-D MAC channel with unit-variance noise and channel gains , . Hence, the achievable secrecy sum rate is given by (118) Therefore, by using the same approach of Section VI-B, one can easily verify that the total secure DoF achievable by the ESA scheme in the -user fading MAC-WT channel is indeed .
XII. CONCLUSION In this paper, we proposed two new achievable schemes for the fading MAC-WT. Our first scheme, the SBA scheme, lets the interfering signals at the main receiver live in a 2-D space, while it aligns the interfering signals at the eavesdropper in a 1-D space. We obtained the secrecy rate region achieved by this scheme. We showed that the secrecy rates achieved by this scheme scale with SNR as , i.e., a total of secure DoF is achievable in the two-user fading MAC-WT. We also showed that the secrecy sum rate achieved by the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with CJ scheme does not scale with SNR, i.e., the achievable secure DoF is zero. As a direct consequence, we showed the suboptimality of the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling based schemes with or without CJ in the fading MAC-WT.
Our second scheme, the ESA scheme, is inspired by the ergodic interference alignment technique. In this scheme, each transmitter repeats its symbols over carefully chosen time instants such that the interfering signals from the transmitters are aligned favorably at the main receiver while they are aligned unfavorably at the eavesdropper. We obtained the secrecy rate region achieved by this scheme and showed that, as in the SBA scheme, the secrecy sum rate achieved by the ESA scheme scales with SNR as . In addition, we introduced an improved version of our ESA scheme where CJ is used as an additional ingredient to achieve higher secrecy rates. Moreover, since the rate expressions achieved with the SBA scheme seem complicated, while the rate expressions achieved with the two versions of the ESA scheme (with and without CJ) are more amenable for optimization of power allocations, we derived the necessary conditions for the optimal power allocation that maximizes the secrecy sum rate achieved by the ESA scheme when used solely and when used with cooperative jamming. Finally, we discussed the extension of our schemes to the case of more than two users and showed that, for the -user fading MAC-WT, our schemes achieve secrecy rates that scale with SNR as . We obtain our allocation policy as follows. Let us denote the solution of (121) and (122) together by solution and denote the solution of (123) and (124) together by solution . i) If solution yields a real nonnegative while solution does not yield real nonnegative , then we take to be the power allocation values for users 1 and 2, respectively, and set . ii) If solution yields a real nonnegative while solution does not yield real nonnegative , then we take to be the power allocation values for users 2 and 1, respectively, and set . iii) If neither solution nor solution gives real nonnegative common root, then we set . iv) If both solutions and yield a real nonnegative common root, then we either choose the root given by solution , i.e., , and set , or choose the root given by solution , i.e., , and set . We make the choice that maximizes the achievable instantaneous secrecy sum rate.
